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“To What Extent Did The HHS Fall Short Of Adequately Interpreting The Medical Loss
Ratio Rule To Address Consumers’ Concerns”

Ina Ilin-Schneider

I.

Introduction
Health experts agree that the U.S. healthcare system is broken and needs significant

reforms to overcome “inefficiencies, excessive administrative expenses, inflated prices, poor
management and inappropriate care, waste and fraud.”1 As healthcare costs increase2 and health
insurance companies increase profits3 and CEO compensations,4 a growing number of
Americans are struggling to afford basic necessities and healthcare.5 Thus, in an effort to find a
solution to the American healthcare crisis and to reform the US crumbling healthcare system, on
March 23, 2010 President Barack Obama signed into law one of the most significant pieces of
legislation in the U.S. healthcare history since the passage of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 -

1

National Coalition on Health Care, Health Care Facts: Costs, available at
http://nchc.org/sites/default/files/resources/Fact%20Sheet%20-%20Cost.pdf
2
Id. Between 2008 and 2018, the national health expenditures are expected to increase at a 6.2%
rate, almost 2% faster than the national GDP, which is expected to increase only 4.1% per year.
3
Emily Walker, Health Insurers Post Record Profits, abcnews .com (Feb. 12, 2010), available at
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/HealthCare/health-insurers-post-record-profits/story?id=9818699&page=3.
In 2009, when America was in the center of a deep economic recession, America's health insurance
companies increased their profits by 56 %, with five largest for profit insurers making a combined profit
of $12.2 billion, while during the same year 2.7 million Americans lost their private coverage.
4
Donna Rodgers, Total Compensation of CEOs at Health Insurance Companies, About.com,
available at http://financialservices.about.com/od/CompRelatedFA/i/Total-Compensation-Of-Ceos-AtHealth-Insurance-Companies.htm. In 2009 Aetna of Connecticut and United Health Group paid their
CEOs about $18,058,162 and $8,901,916, respectively.
5
Steven Reinberg, 25 Million Americans Are 'Underinsured', U.S.News & World Report (June 10,
2008), available at http://health.usnews.com/health-news/family-health/articles/2008/06/10/25-millionamericans-are-underinsured_print.html. Nearly 42 % of adults ages 19 to 64, which is approximately 75
million Americans, were either uninsured or underinsured according to 2007 estimates.
1

the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”),6 informally called the “Affordable
Care Act” (“ACA”). 7
One of the key additions to the ACA is section 2718 of the Public Health Service Act
(“PHSA”),8 which requires health insurance issuers (‘issuers”) offering individual or group
coverage to submit annual reports to the Secretary of Health and Human Services (“Secretary”)
on the percentages of premiums that the issuer spends on reimbursement for clinical services and
activities that improve healthcare quality (“QIA”) and to provide rebates to enrollees when the
issuers fail to meet the given year’s minimum requirements.9 Under the direction of section
2718, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) developed uniform
definitions and standardized calculating methodologies for requiring issuers to spend at least 80
to 85 percent of their premiums on actual medical care and quality,” with the remaining 15 to 20
percent going towards administrative costs, marketing, and other non-healthcare related costs.10
The NAIC defined these activities as the Medical Loss Ratio (“MLR”).11
On December 1, 2010, the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) adopted
and certified in full all of the recommendations of the NAIC regarding the MLRs in the interim

6

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (hereafter, ACA), Pub.L. 111-148, Senate and
House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress, 42 USC 18001, Mar. 23, 1010,
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ148/pdf/PLAW-111publ148.pdf.
7
Michael D. Tanner, Gad Medicine, A guide to the Real Costs and Consequences of the New
Health Care Law, The Cato Institute (2011), http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/BadMedicineWP.pdf.
8
ACA), Pub.L. 111-148, Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress, 42 USC 18001, Mar. 23, 1010, §2718, also available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW111publ148/pdf/PLAW-111publ148.pdf. Section 2718, 42 U.S.C. 300gg-18, was added by sections 1001
and 10101 of the PPACA.
9
Id.
10
NAIC Adopts Final Medical Loss Ratio Regulations, National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (Oct. 21, 2010), available at
http://www.naic.org/Releases/2010_docs/naic_adopts_final_mlr_regs.htm,
See also, Uniform definitions and standard methodologies for medical loss ratios adopted by
NAIC available at http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_ex_mlr_reg_asadopted.pdf
11
Id.
2

final regulation implementing the MLR standards.12 In response to consumer advocacy concerns,
however, on May 16, 2012, the HHS issued an important amendment to the final rule that
entered into effect on June 15, 2012, establishing a notice requirement for issuers in the group
and individual markets that meet or exceed the applicable MLR standard.13
The HHS emphasized that the purpose of the new federal MLR standard is to help ensure
that policyholders receive value for their premium dollars by requiring insurers not only to spend
a defined minimum on healthcare related services, but also by requiring health insurance
companies that spend less than the minimum MLR to rebate the portion of the premiums in
excess of the limit starting in 2011.14
This paper focuses on how the HHS has interpreted the new MLR regulation particularly
within the context of the MLR waivers and the MLR notice requirements. It explores the ways in
which the HHS’ interpretation of the rule has not met the demands of the consumer groups,
while also addressing several concerns raised by the issuers. Finally the paper provides
recommendations on how the HHS can provide more guidance. Mainly, the paper recommends
HHS, 45 CFR Part 158, “Health Insurance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss Ratio (MLR)
Requirements Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Interim Final Rule,” Federal
Register, December 1, 2010, p. 74886.
The final rule was promulgated in 2011 (HHS, 45 CFR Part 158, “Medical Loss Ratio
Requirements Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Final Rule,” Federal Register,
December 7, 2011).s
13
HHS, 45 CFR Part 158, “Medical Loss Ratio Rebate Requirements Under the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act; Final Rule,” Federal Register, May 16, 2012. Since the issuance of the final
rule, the HHS issued an amendment on May 16, 2012, effective on June 15, 2012, to the regulations
implementing the MLR standards, to establish a notice requirement for issuers in the group and individual
markets that meet or exceed the applicable MLR standard.
14
Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: The affordable Care Act: Secure Health Coverage for
the Middle class (June 28, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2012/06/28/fact-sheet-affordable-care-act-secure-health-coverage-middle-class. In the wake of the
Supreme Court’s decision, upholding the constitutionality of the “Obamacare,” the office of the press
secretary issued a statement stating that the main goal of ACA is to ensure that “hardworking, middle
class families will get the security they deserve” and that every American is protected from the “worst
insurance company abuses.” The statement went on to emphasize that the ACA incorporates various
provisions, such as the MLR, to “keep health care costs low, promote prevention, and hold insurance
companies accountable.”
12

3

that the HHS, (i) provides a clear workable definition of market destabilization, which is
currently lacking, (ii) equips the Secretary with uniform principles on how to measure market
destabilization when determining that the individual market is likely to destabilize due to
immediate application of the federal MLR standard, (iii) requires the issuers to submit hard data,
showing the likely risk of destabilization to prevent onerous and faulty waiver applications, (iv)
requires timely public disclosures of MLR adjustment requests and extends the public hearing
period to allow consumers ample opportunity to voice their concerns to a MLR waiver
application, (v) strengthens the notice requirement by necessitating issuers to provide a frequent
annual notice, (vi) removes ambiguities by requiring issuers to describe in greater detail what
the MLR is, how it is calculated and what it means for the consumers, and (vii) requires issuers
to disclose their current and previous year’s MLRs to enable consumers to evaluate the existing
issuer’s performance and compare its MLRs to those of other issuers. The paper concludes with
an assertion that only through the implementation of the recommended amendments will the
HHS be able to guarantee that consumers’ premiums are primarily spend on healthcare, rather
than overhead, marketing, and extravagant executive compensation and bonuses.
II.

MLR Waivers
A. HHS Requirements for MLR Adjustment in States’ Individual Markets
The new federal MLR standards, established under section 2718(b)(a)(A) of the PHSA

for insurance coverage provided in individual, small group and large group markets, 15 measures
the percentage of the total insurance premiums that health plans use on healthcare and quality

HHS, 45 CFR Part 158, “Health Insurance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss Ratio (MLR)
Requirements Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Interim Final Rule,” Federal
Register, December 1, 2010, p. 74886.
15

4

improvements16 as opposed to administration, marketing and profit.17 Accordingly, the higher a
plan’s MLR the higher the issuer’s contribution of received premiums on health benefits rather
than overhead and the higher the value to a consumer.18 The HHS has set the MLR at a minimum
of 80 percent for the individual health insurance market,19 providing the HHS Secretary,
however, with the authority to grant a waiver from the 80 percent standard under section 2718
(b)(1)(A)(ii).20 Specifically, section 2718 (b)(1)(A)(ii) allows the HHS Secretary to adjust the 80
percent mark downwards, vis-à-vis grant a waiver, for State’s individual market, “if the

16

CSR Report for Congress (Sept. 18, 2012), p. 7-8, available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42735.pdf. The CSR Report states that “[t]o be classified as a quality
initiative, spending must meet four specific criteria developed by the NAIC. An activity must: 1. Improve
health outcomes by implementing activities such as quality reporting, effective case management, care
coordination, chronic disease management, or medication and care compliance initiatives; 2. Implement
activities to prevent hospital readmissions including a comprehensive program for hospital discharge that
includes patient education and counseling, discharge planning, and post-discharge follow-up by an
appropriate health care professional; 3. Implement activities to improve patient safety and reduce medical
errors through the use of best clinical practices, evidence-based medicine, and health information
technology under the plan or coverage; and 4. Implement wellness and health promotion activities.”
Additionally, HHS will consider non-claims expenses as quality improvement, but only if they meet one
of the four specific criteria developed by the NAIC, mentioned above, and meet all the following
requirements: 1. Designed to improve health care quality; 2. Designed to increase the likelihood of
desired health outcomes in ways that can be objectively measured and that can produce verifiable results
and achievements; 3. Directed toward individual enrollees or incurred for specific segments of enrollees
or provide health improvements to the population beyond those enrolled in coverage, so long as no
additional costs are incurred due to the non-enrollees; 4. Grounded in evidence-based medicine, widely
accepted best clinical practice, or criteria issued by recognized professional medical associations,
accreditation bodies, government agencies or other nationally recognized health care quality.
17
HHS, 45 CFR Part 158, “Medical Loss Ratio Requirements Under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act; Final Rule,” Federal Register, Dec. 7, 2011, p. 76585.
18
CSR Report for Congress (Sept. 18, 2012), p. 1, available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42735.pdf. “The MLR is based on a health plan’s overall performance,
however, not on individual experience. It is an aggregate measure that in general terms compares the
benefits paid to aggregate premiums.”
19
HHS, 45 CFR Part 158, “Health Insurance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss Ratio (MLR)
Requirements Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Interim Final Rule,” Federal
Register, December 1, 2010, §158.210(a)-(c), p. 74886.
20
Id, §158.210(d), p. 74886.
5

Secretary determines that the application of such 80 percent may destabilize the individual
market in such State.” 21
The reasoning behind the HHS’s permissive regulation on waivers allowing States to
apply for an adjustment to the 80 percent MLR lies in the language of section 2118(b)(A)(ii),22
and the unique circumstances surrounding the individual market,23 which is currently used by

21

Id. The waiver can be granted solely for individual health insurance market. Section 2718 does
not give the Secretary the authority to grant waivers for small group or large group health insurance
markets. Moreover, each of the fifty States has the power to set their own MLR rates, provided however
that they meet the minimum requirements under the PHSA. Thus, when States require a higher MLR
within that State, health insurance issuers are obligated to meet the higher mandate: “[F]or coverage
offered in a State whose law provides that issuers in the State must meet a higher MLR than set forth in §
158.210, the State’s higher percentage must be substituted for the percentage stated in § 158.210.”
However, in States where the MLR rates are below 80 percent, the new MLR regulation may preempt the
lower MLR requirements beginning in September 23, 2010, even if the MLR rates were set prior to the
PHSA (NCSL (July 2, 2012), Medical Loss Ratios for Health Insurance, available at
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/health-insurance-medical-loss-ratios.aspx)
22
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub.L. 111-148, Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress, 42 USC 18001, Mar. 23, 2010, available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ148/pdf/PLAW-111publ148.pdf
23
Lester Feder and Ellen-Marie Whelan, “An Unhealthy Individual Health Insurance Market”,
Center for American Progress (Dec. 23, 2008), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/healthcare/news/2008/12/23/5259/an-unhealthy-individualhealth-insurance-market/#1. The authors in this article emphasize the inability to pool risk as a distinctive
characteristic of an individual market. In their view, risk pooling is the foundation of insurance in small
and large group markets, where the premiums of all subscribers are pooled together to subsidize the cost
of care of a person who gets sick. “The more people share the risk, the less each individual needs to pay
into the pool.” Thus, “in a pool of diverse workers, sicker and older people are balanced by healthier and
younger ones.” However, in the individual market, subscribers do not have anyone to share the cost with.
Accordingly, “insurance companies assess how much care a subscriber is likely to require, and then limit
benefits, fix deductibles, and set premiums accordingly. Not surprisingly, “premiums for individuals start
at a higher rate than those for businesses, because insurers assume that those who are likely to seek out
individual insurance are more likely to need care than those who do not.
Kelly Loussedes, “NAHU Supports Legislation to Protect Consumers and Jobs,” NAHU (Feb. 3,
2012), available at http://www.nahu.org/media/releases/2012/MLR_Senate_Final.pdf. Individual market
also heavily relies on agents and brokers . In particular, because individuals (and also small businesses)
may be unfamiliar with different insurance coverage policies, they largely depend on “licensed agents and
brokers to help them navigate the health care marketplace and find health plans that suit their needs and
budgets.” Many insurers argue that negotiating premiums, processing claims and enrolling employees
without agents' expert advice will cause many individuals and businesses to spend more for health
insurance and receive less care. Despite insurers’ concerns, agents’ and brokers’ fees are considered an
administrative cost under the current law, arguably leaving many insurers in the individual market with
lower MLR ratios than they otherwise would have. As a consequence the issuers in individual markets
argue that they will be unable to immediately meet the 80% MLR target and will be forced to abandon the
6

approximately 195.9 million Americans, or 64 percent of total population.24 Thus, the State’s
insurance commissioner or other applicable State official25 may submit an application for a
temporary adjustment to the 80 percent MLR to the HHS Secretary.26 At this point, the Secretary
must review the application and determine whether the adjustment is appropriate due to the
volatility of the individual market.27 Only when the Secretary concludes that the immediate
application of the 80% MLR carries the potential of destabilizing the individual market, may the

individual market. This in turn could result in consumers struggling to find new coverage or losing their
existing coverage altogether.
HHS, 45 CFR Part 158, “Health Insurance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss Ratio (MLR)
Requirements Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Interim Final Rule,” Federal
Register, December 1, 2010, §158.101. In light of the complicated intricacies prevalent in the individual
market, section 2718(b)(A)(ii) allows the Secretary to adjust the MLR standard in the individual market if
requiring compliance with the MLR may destabilize the market.
24
Emily Smith and Caitlin Stark, By the numbers: Health insurance, cnn.com (June 28, 2012),
available at http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/27/politics/btn-health-care/index.html. The individual market
for health insurance coverage is purchased by individuals, families and sole proprietors. In comparison,
group health insurance coverage is a policy that is purchased by an employer and offered to eligible
employees of the company and often their family members (NAHU, Consumer Guide To Group Health
Insurance, available at http://www.nahu.org/consumer/groupinsurance.cfm).
25
HHS, 45 CFR Part 158, “Health Insurance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss Ratio (MLR)
Requirements Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Interim Final Rule,” Federal
Register, December 1, 2010, §158.310), p. 74887. Section 158.310 provides that a request for an
adjustment to the MLR standard for a State be submitted by the State’s insurance commissioner or other
applicable State official. State insurance commissioner is of special importance for several reasons. First,
State insurance commissioners have local knowledge of their State’s insurance market, which makes them
highly qualified and they share a responsibility to protect the general public, policy holders and enrollees
within their state.
26
See, HHS on “The 80/20 Rule: Providing Value and Rebates to Millions of Consumers” (June 21,
2012), available at http://www.healthcare.gov/law/resources/reports/mlr-rebates06212012a.html. The
waiver will be granted only on a temporary annual basis. Thus, a state cannot get a permanent adjustment,
but is merely given more time to comply with the 80% MLR.
27
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub.L. 111-148, Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress, 42 USC 18001, Mar. 23, 1010,
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ148/pdf/PLAW-111publ148.pdf
NCSL (July 2, 2012), Medical Loss Ratios for Health Insurance, available at
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/health-insurance-medical-loss-ratios.aspx. As of February
2012, a total of seventeen states and Guam have requested waivers. However, only Maine, New
Hampshire, Nevada, North Carolina, Iowa, Kentucky and Georgia were granted reprieves. This low
number of granted waivers reflects the importance of MLR requirement that according to HHS will
"provide protection and value to approximately 74.8 million insured Americans.”
7

Secretary grant a waiver.28 Importantly, the Secretary has a substantial discretion in deciding
whether there is a possibility for market destabilization, due to the absence of uniform and clear
definitions and criteria for market destabilization.29

B. Consumer Advocates Response to HHS’ Adjustment Requirements
The consumer advocates strongly believe that the 80 percent MLR standard will
effectively put more pressure on insurers to decrease premiums and become more efficient. 30 At
the same time it will ensure that consumers are reimbursed for health services that they did not
receive because their insurer failed to comply with the law.31 While the consumer advocates’
accept the HHS’ position justifying a temporary adjustment to the MLR under special
circumstances,32 they are nevertheless concerned about the lack of a standard and effective

HHS, 45 CFR Part 158, “Health Insurance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss Ratio (MLR)
Requirements Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Interim Final Rule,” Federal
Register, December 1, 2010.
29
Id.
30
See, Letter from Consumer Groups to the NAIC (June 28, 2011) expressing their concerns about
proposed methods to weaken the MLR provisions of the ACA, available at
http://healthcareforamericanow.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Consumer-organization-comments-onreport-to-PHIA-28June2011.pdf.
See also, e.g. Testimony of Timothy S. Jost, House Small Business Subcommittee, to the New
Medical Loss Ratios, available at http://smallbusiness.house.gov/uploadedfiles/jost_testimony.pdf
28

31

Id.

Meg Haskell, “Feds give Maine waiver for percent insurers spend on health care,” (March 9,
2011), available at http://bangordailynews.com/2011/03/08/health/maine-granted-insurance-waiver-formedical-loss-ratio/. Main was the first state to receive a waiver to the MLR requirement. The Secretary
found sufficient evidence to indicate that there is likelihood that the 80% MLR will cause insurers to exit
the individual market and leave thousands of consumers without coverage. Specifically, Main has only 3
insurers that offer individual coverage. In 2010, Megalife, one of just three health insurance companies
that sell individual coverage indicated that it might leave the fragile individual market in Main if the MLR
were implemented. The two other companies that sell individual coverage are Anthem Blue Cross and
32

8

definition for market destabilization as well as the insufficient public hearing for adjustment
requests.33
As of today, the final regulation, not only authorizes, but in fact requires the HHS
Secretary, absent any uniform definition or test for market destabilization, to grant an adjustment
to the applicable MLR whenever the Secretary finds “a reasonable likelihood that market
destabilization and thus harm to consumers will occur.”34 Despite the HHS’ seemingly sound
justification for choosing not to bind the Secretary to any specific test,35 the consumer advocates
argue that there is a danger in the Secretary’s use of different set of criteria36 in each state that

Blue Shield of Maine and the nonprofit Harvard Pilgrim company that administers the subsidized
DirigoChoice program. Megalife’s exit would have left some 14,000 Mainers looking for new, and likely
more expensive, coverage. Thus, in light of these circumstances, the Secretary determined that a phase-in
MLR approach is more appropriate.
33
HHS, 45 CFR Part 158, “Health Insurance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss Ratio (MLR)
Requirements Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Interim Final Rule,” Federal
Register, Dec. 1, 2010, p. 74889. The HHS has not clearly defined market destabilization because it
believes that it is “difficult to generalize and create a single numeric test given the different characteristics
of State insurance markets, different State laws, and different types of issuers.” Thus, the rule is liberally
crafted to give the Secretary great discretion to decide when market destabilization is possible. The HHS
provides some guidance in the 5 criteria listed under § 158.330, however, these criteria are non-binding
and non-exclusive. Accordingly, the HHS has given the Secretary an excessive power to decide what
criteria and what definitions to employ when making the decision. This suggests that the HHS is
performing a legislative and an adjudicative function, where the Secretary acts as a fact finder.
34
Id at 74886.
35
Id. See fn 32. Also, the NAIC Consumer Representatives suggested in their issue resolution
document that addressed market destabilization that “the Secretary consider existing State laws and
historic MLRs in each State.” The Secretary seeks information regarding existing State laws and issuers’
MLRs in order to consider them in connection with a State’s request for an adjustment of the MLR
standard in the individual market.
36
Id. §158.330. The HHS provides the Secretary with the following 5 non-binding and nonexclusive criteria: (a) The number of issuers reasonably likely to exit the State or to cease offering
coverage in the State absent an adjustment to the 80 percent MLR and the resulting impact on competition
in the State. In making this determination the Secretary may consider as to each issuer that is reasonably
likely to exit the State: (1) Each issuer’s MLR relative to an 80 percent MLR; (2) Each issuer’s solvency
and profitability, as measured by factors such as surplus level, risked-based capital ratio, net income, and
operating or underwriting gain; (3) The requirements and limitations within the State with respect to
market withdrawals; and (4) Whether each issuer covers less than 1,000 life-years in the State’s individual
insurance market. (b) The number of individual market enrollees covered by issuers that are reasonably
likely to exit the State absent an adjustment to the 80 percent MLR. (c) Whether absent an adjustment to
the 80 percent MLR standard consumers may be unable to access agents and brokers. (d) The alternate
coverage options within the State available to individual market enrollees in the event an issuer exits the
9

submits a waiver application.37 In particular, the use of different criteria creates different
standards for market destabilization in different states.38 Thus, the HHS’ waiver policy has the
advantage of providing the Secretary with sufficient flexibility to determine the unique market
conditions in each applicant’s individual market,39 however, it also creates an environment of
uncertainty, which might and in fact invited a number of states to almost arbitrarily apply for a
waiver.40
One of the most prominent examples for a groundless waiver application41 comes from
the state of Florida, which drew a substantial amount of criticism42 for its lack of substance.43

market, including: (1) Any requirement that issuers who exit the State’s individual market must have their
block(s) of business assumed by another issuer; (2) The issuers that may remain in the State subsequent to
the implementation of the 80 percent MLR, as calculated in accordance with this Part, and the nature,
terms, and price of the products offered by such issuers; (3) The capacity of remaining issuers to write
additional business, as measured by their risk based capital ratios; (4) The mechanisms, such as
guaranteed issue products, an issuer of last resort, or a State high risk pool, available to the State to
provide coverage to consumers in the event of an issuer withdrawing from the market, and the
affordability of these options compared to the coverage provided by exiting or potentially exiting issuers;
and (5) Any authority the State’s insurance commissioner, superintendent, or comparable official may
exercise with respect to stabilization of the individual insurance market. (e) The impact on premiums
charged, and on benefits and cost-sharing provided, to consumers by issuers remaining in the market in
the event one or more issuers were to withdraw from the market. (f) Any other relevant information
submitted by the State’s insurance commissioner, superintendent, or comparable official in the State’s
request.
37

See fn 32 and 33

38

Id.
Id.
40
HHS, Key Developments, “HHS releases fact sheet regarding MLR waiver requests,” (Feb. 17,
2012), available at http://healthreformgps.org/resources/hhs-releases-fact-sheet-regarding-mlr-waiverrequests/. HHS has conducted a review of 17 states that have requested a waiver from the law’s
requirement that individual market health plans spend at least 80 percent of premiums on medical care or
give customers rebates. In total, HHS has rejected 10 requests from North Dakota, Delaware, Texas,
Kansas, Oklahoma, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan and Wisconsin, and approved or modified
applications from seven states Maine, New Hampshire, Kentucky, Nevada, Iowa, Georgia and North
Carolina.
41
Margaret Dick Tocknell, “CMS Denies Florida's MLR Waiver Request,” HealthLeaders Media,
(Dec. 16, 2011), available at http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/page-2/HEP-274382/CMS-DeniesFloridas-MLR-Waiver-Request.
42
Carl McDonald, “Sometimes the Hardest Thing Is Knowing Which Bridge to Cross & the One to
Burn - Analysis of Florida’s Minimum MLR Waiver,” (March 16, 2011) available at
https://ir.citi.com/%2FgP0XTkW03Aafg86NrdCRpvuDF%2FoMGNXCrsxxvfE44I%3D. Citi analyst
Carl MacDonald stated that “Florida’s argument for significant market disruption is weak, as none of the
39

10

Organizations representing healthcare consumers and health insurance policyholders throughout
the state voiced their concerns44 in a letter to HHS Secretary, Kathleen Sebelius, about the
petition submitted45 by the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation (“OIR”) seeking an outright
waiver of the 80 percent MLR requirement in the Florida’s individual market.46 The HHS denied
Florida’s adjustment request on December 15, 2011 because it failed to provide sufficient
evidence47 that adherence to the MLR standard would result in a reasonable likelihood of market

six largest plans in the state (which dominate the individual market, with 85% market share) will drop out
of the state because of the minimum MLR requirement. Granting the waiver would also deprive
consumers of an estimated $60 million in rebates based on the 2009 data.”
43
See, fn 40.
44
Letter from Ethan Rome, HCAN executive director, to Kathleen Sebelius, HHS Secretary, (Oct
26, 2011), “Re: Florida MLR Adjustment Application and HCAN Request for Public Hearing” available
at http://healthcareforamericanow.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/HCAN-public-comment-Florida.pdf.
According to the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation submission, “if the adjustment is not granted,
individuals and businesses in Florida will receive rebates of approximately $76 million in 2011, $51
million in 2012, and $47 million in 2013.” However, “if the requested adjustments are granted, consumers
will instead receive rebates of $5 million in 2011, $5 million in 2012, and $24 million in 2013.” In light
of this projection “the adjustment would rob Florida consumers of $140 million and give that money to
insurance companies that fail to meet basic federal standards.” Additionally, it “would also deprive
Floridians of future savings by removing powerful incentives for insurers to lower premiums by cutting
administrative expenses to achieve lower MLR thresholds.”
45
Petition of the State of Florida For an Adjustment of the MLR Provisions (March 11, 2011),
available at http://cciio.cms.gov/programs/marketreforms/mlr/states/Florida/petition_mlr_03112011.pdf.
Florida included several general statements that the MLR requirements will cause a reduction in the
number of issuers in the individual market which will result in reduced consumer choice in that market.
However, the application did not provide hard evidence of the possibility of market destabilization.
However, absent a clear cut set of criteria for market destabilization, it is not surprising that the State of
Florida applied for a waiver, in the hope that it might miraculously be granted.
46
Letter from HCAN to Kathleen Sebelius, HHS Secretary, “Re: Objections to Florida adjustment
of the Medical Loss Ratio Standard in the Individual Market,” (Oct. 27, 2011), available at
http://healthcareforamericanow.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Florida-Chain-and-Organize-NowMLR-comments.pdf3_.pdf. Florida modified its application in subsequent correspondence, requesting a
gradual adoption of the MLR standard: 68%, 72%, and 76% for the years 2011, 2012, and 2013,
respectively.
47
Letter from HHS to Florida’s Commissioner, Kevin McCarty, “Re: State of Florida’s Request for
Adjustment to Medical Loss Ratio Standard” (Dec 15, 2011), available at
http://cciio.cms.gov/programs/marketreforms/mlr/states/Florida/2011%201215%20FL%20MLR%20Adj
%20Determination%20Letter.pdf. The HHS appears to heavily rely on the 5 criteria listed in the final
regulation in its determination of whether to grant Florida’s application. This, suggests that despite the
broad authority given to the Secretary under the rules, the HHS still considers the five criteria to be the
primary criteria in determining market destabilization. Nonetheless, the fact that these criteria are not
binding gave an impression to the State of Florida that it can apply for a waiver.
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destabilization and harm to consumers.48 Steve Larsen, director of the CMS Center for Consumer
Information and Insurance Oversight, noted that Florida’s application received an
"unprecedented level of public comment that was uniformly in opposition to the adjustment."49
Florida is one of 10 States that received a denial from the HHS Secretary to the request
for the MLR adjustment.50 This high rate of rejected applications51 is promising as it reflects the
importance of the MLR requirement and according to HHS will "provide protection and value to
approximately 74.8 million insured Americans.”52 However, it also reflects a lack of certainty
regarding when an application is warranted due to ambiguous criteria for market destabilization
and thus provides incentives for States to apply for adjustments without offering hard data.53

48

Letter from Steven B. Larsen, Deputy Administrator and Director at the Center for Consumer
Information and Insurance Oversight to the Honorable Kevin M. McCarty, Commissioner at the Florida
Office of Insurance Regulation, “Re: State of Florida’s Request for Adjustment to Medical Loss Ratio
Standard” (Dec. 15, 2011), available at
http://cciio.cms.gov/programs/marketreforms/mlr/states/Florida/2011%201215%20FL%20MLR%20Adj
%20Determination%20Letter.pdf. The HHS has determined that no adjustment to the medical loss ratio
standard in Florida is necessary. Florida’s application provides ample evidence that the State has a
competitive individual health insurance market and will allow consumers to continue to receive adequate
coverage. Specifically, Florida’s application shows that “most issuers in the Florida individual market
either: already meet the 80 percent MLR standard, are sufficiently profitable to provide rebate payments if
they fail to meet the 80 percent MLR standard, or are adapting their business models in order to provide
consumers better value for their premium dollar.” In light of these conclusions, the HHS does not expect
“any issuers to withdraw from the Florida individual market and therefore could not conclude that it is
“reasonably likely” that the market will be destabilized if the 80 percent standard is not adjusted.” This
determination will ensure consumers receive a better value for their premium dollar.
49
Margaret Dick Tocknell, “CMS Denies Florida's MLR Waiver Request”, HealthLeaders Media
(Dec. 16, 2011), available at http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/print/HEP-274382/CMS-DeniesFloridas-MLR-Waiver-Request
50
See, fn 40.
51

Id. from the 17 states only 7 states were granted a waiver, the other 10 states were rejected.

HHS Statement, “Medical Loss Ratio: Getting Your Money's Worth on Health Insurance,” CCIIO
(Dec. 2, 2011), available at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/health-insurance-medical-lossratios.aspx.
53
See, Officials in 17 States Ask HHS to Phase-in MLR Requirements,
http://www.healthcareexchange.com/blog/michael-gomes/officials-17-states-ask-hhs-phase-mlrrequirements (March 2, 2012, 10:58 EST).
See also, Additional Details on NAIC MLR Resolution While HHS Continues to Process State
Waivers, http://www.healthcareexchange.com/blog/michael-gomes/additional-details-naic-mlr-resolutionwhile-hhs-continues-process-state-waivers (Nov. 29, 2011, 10:17 EST). “On the state front, many state
regulators have been reluctant to back the MLR proposal out of concern for the impact the MLR would
52
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In addition to uniform principles, the consumer advocates suggest that to prevent
arbitrary waiver applications, the HHS should subject the request for adjustment to timely public
disclosure54 with an extended public hearing period55 requiring insurers to present hard data56
affording consumers an opportunity to actively engage in the process.57 Ultimately, however, the
waiver is only a temporary solution and the insurers would have to make necessary adjustments
to conform to the new MLR requirements during the years leading up to 2014.58
C. Insurers Response to HHS’ Adjustment Requirements
The health insurance companies that sell coverage in the individual market strongly
oppose the new MLR regulation contending that it will force many insurers to abandon this

have on their state’s individual and small group health insurance markets. To help prevent major
disruptions, PPACA proponents included the option for the HHS Secretary to issue temporary waivers.
Many states have, or are, applying for MLR waivers in order to prevent undue disruptions in their
respective insurance markets.”
54
HHS, 45 CFR Part 158, “Health Insurance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss Ratio (MLR)
Requirements Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Interim Final Rule,” Federal
Register, Dec. 1, 2010, p. 74886 -74888. Section 158.340 through 158.345: To ensure efficiency, the
State’s request for adjustment must be submitted in electronic format and will be promptly posted on the
Secretary’s healthcare.gov website, at which point in time the Secretary will then invite public comment
and consider any comments filed by the public within 10 days of the posting. The final rule states that the
State will also have an opportunity to hold a public hearing and create an evidentiary record. However,
the only HHS encourages, but does not require states to hold public hearings for adjustment requests
55
Id.
56
See, Letter from HCAN to Kathleen Sebelius, HHS Secretary, “OCIIO-9998-IFC” (Jan. 31,
2011), available at http://healthcareforamericanow.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/HCAN-Commentson-MLR-Rule-FINAL-31Jan11.pdf. Like the Florida example demonstrates, the request for adjustment is
often missing supporting data. This is also evident from the fact that 10 out of 17 requests were in fact
rejected by the HHS Secretary.
57
Letter from HCAN to Kathleen Sebelius, HHS Secretary, “OCIIO-9998-IFC” (Jan. 31, 2011),
supra. The Office of Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight urges the HHS in the final rule to
strengthen the process as outlined in the final rule to require a public hearing for each adjustment request.
“While states also are encouraged (but not required) to hold hearings regarding the such requests,
experience with state-level hearings so far indicates that insurers often do not present hard data or face
tough questions (Missouri) and that consumers are not invited to be full participants (Florida), depriving
them of the opportunity to ask critical questions of state officials, insurance executives and producers.”
58
Testimony of Timothy S. Jost, House Small Business Subcommittee, to the New Medical Loss
Ratios, available at http://smallbusiness.house.gov/uploadedfiles/jost_testimony.pdf . The fact that most
insurance companies do not like the MLR requirements does not mean that they are incapable of
complying with it. Neither does the fact that some insurance companies will have to accept reduced
profits in order to meet the new standard.
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market segment, leaving consumers either with increased premiums due to the decrease in
competition for individual coverage or in the worst scenario leave them without coverage
altogether. 59
In support, the issuers advance several arguments. First, because individuals and small
businesses rely heavily on insurance agents’ and brokers’ services to navigate through the
complicate and intricate policy plans60 the fees for such agents and brokers are part of
administrative cost in the MLR calculation.61 The issuers argue that in an effort to meet the 80
percent MLR mark, they will be forced to reduce the agents’ and brokers’ compensation.62 Thus,
to change the MLR formula allowing issuers to move these expenses off the books, the agents
and brokers have been lobbying Congress to change the law and create a special exemption for

Kelly Loussedes, “NAHU Supports Legislation to Protect Consumers and Jobs,” NAHU (Feb. 3,
2012), available at http://www.nahu.org/media/releases/2012/MLR_Senate_Final.pdf. Consumer choice
is reduced because there will be fewer insurers in the individual market. Thus consumers will struggle to
find new coverage or lose their existing coverage in the individual market.
60
Id. Janet Trautwein, NAHU CEO, stated that “millions of individuals and small businesses
depend on licensed agents and brokers to help them navigate the health care marketplace and find health
plans that suit their needs and budgets, […] in fact, as the Congressional Budget Office reported, agents
and brokers often serve as de facto human resources departments for many small firms -- negotiating
premiums, processing claims and enrolling employees. Without agents' expert advice, many individuals
and businesses will end up spending more for health insurance and receive less care.”
61
HHS, 45 CFR Part 158, “Health Insurance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss Ratio (MLR)
Requirements Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Interim Final Rule,” Federal
Register, Dec. 1, 2010, § 158.160(b)(2)(iv).
62
HHS, 45 CFR Part 158, “Health Insurance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss Ratio (MLR)
Requirements Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Interim Final Rule,” Federal
Register, Dec. 1, 2010, p. 74877. The NAIC raised their concerns regarding the potential impact of the
MLR regulation on agents’ and brokers’ fees and commissions. It argued that some individual market
insurers in some States may be particularly reliant on producers to distribute their products. “Agents and
brokers perform a range of functions on behalf of consumers and companies. In some cases, issuers may
have entered into longer term compensation arrangements with agents and brokers which the MLR
standard may stress. The NAIC considered, but declined to incorporate in the model regulation, special
treatment for such expenses in the MLR calculations. The NAIC opted instead to establish a working
group with HHS to address the impact of the ACA on agents and brokers, especially during years leading
up to 2014.” Accordingly, the impact of MLR standard on agents and brokers merits recognition. Thus, if
the State has a valid argument that its individual market for health coverage will likely face
destabilization, the HHS directs the Secretary to factor in the impact of the MLR standard on agents and
brokers in the determination of whether to grant an adjustment to the MLR.
59
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their fees.63 However, the U.S. GAO has observed that if the bill passes, the exclusion would
result in lower actual MLRs. 64 This would allow issuers to spend a lower portion of the premium
dollars on healthcare and QIAs.65
Second, issuers contend that as insurers exit the market or change exiting policies,
consumers’ choice for individual insurers will greatly diminish or disappear entirely. 66

Id. The new bill “H.R. 1206: Access to Professional Health Insurance Advisors Act of 2011” has
been assigned by the committees and sent to the House or Senate as a whole for consideration on
September 20, 2012. However, currently only 29% of all House bills reported favorably.
See, HCAN “Stop H.R.1206: Protect the Medical Loss Ratio” available at
http://healthcareforamericanow.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Oppose-HR1206-talking-points.pdf.
H.R. 1206: Access to Professional Health Insurance Advisors Act of 2011 has been introduced by agents
and brokers who are paid by insurance companies to sell insurance coverage to individuals, families and
businesses. The fees and commissions of insurance agents and brokers are currently considered
administrative expenses for the purposes of MLR. Some insurance plans have reduced such fees, citing
the new MLR as the reason. In light of the fee reduction, agents and brokers have been lobbying Congress
to change the law to create a special exemption for their fees. This exemption would allow insurers to
continue charging as much as 30% or 40% of premiums for expenses unrelated to health care. Advocacy
groups vehemently disagree with the proposal arguing that changing the treatment of agent and broker
commissions would undermine the MLR formula, deny consumers rebates, and disrupt the MLR’s ability
to constrain premium costs. Accordingly, these changes to the MLR would ignore or purposely
misclassify significant expenses.
64
See, US Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters, “Private Health
Insurance: Early Experiences Implementing New Medical Loss Ratio Requirements,” GAO (July 2011),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11711.pdf. According to the US Government Accountability
Office, almost an entire sample of seven insurers it interviewed reduced brokers’ commissions and made
adjustments to premiums in order to increase their MLRs as required by the PPACA.
For criticism of issuers’ perspective, see also, Consumers Union Report, “Brokers Bill Could Cut
Consumer Healthcare Rebates by Two-Thirds Consumers Union examines H.R. 1206 as House
Committee Prepares for Markup,” Consumer’s Union (Sept. 19, 2012), available at
http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/2012/09/018473print.html. Consumer advocates recognize that
brokers have an important role in the health insurance market, however, they insist that broker’s fees and
commissions are inherently an administrative, not medical, cost. Brokers’ commissions can absorb 10
percent or more of premiums, thus, removing them from the MLR formula would exempt a large
administrative cost from the MLR calculation. The result would effectively undercut the rule’s
effectiveness at lowering costs and improving value for consumers. Friedholm, Director of Health Reform
for Consumers Union stated: “We recognize that brokers have a role to play, particularly in the small
group market, but the first concern must be the impact on consumers. And overwhelmingly, the evidence
shows that MLR is working for consumers and should not be weakened by this regulation.
See also, Letter from consumer, provider and employer organizations to Congress (March 28,
2011), available at http://healthcareforamericanow.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Consumer-letter-toHill-opposing-MLR-legislation-FINAL.pdf
63

65

Id.
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According to a report carried out by the NAIC Health Care Reform Actuarial Working Group
and adopted by the NAIC, states with stricter MLR requirements have not observed any
problems with consumer access to insurance or producers.67 Consumers undeniably need strong
market competition to keep health insurance costs down and service up,68 however, they do not
benefit from infinite health insurance choices if they provide inferior services.69
D. Criticism and Recommendations for HHS Waiver Policy
The main criticism of the HHS’ waiver policy from the consumer advocates’ side is
HHS’s failure to provide a clear and workable definition for what constitutes market
destabilization creating an environment of uncertainty.70 In addition the HHS failed to require

HHS, 45 CFR Part 158, “Health Insurance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss Ratio (MLR)
Requirements Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Interim Final Rule,” Federal
Register, Dec. 1, 2010, p. 74886.
67
NAIC Committee Adopts MLR Report Addressing Brokers' Commissions: Study Provides Mix
Findings, http://www.healthcareexchange.com/blog/michael-gomes/naic-committee-adopts-mlr-reportaddressing-brokers-commissions-study-provides-mi (June 9, 2011, 13:56 EST)
68
Email from Consumers Union to Kathleen Sebelius, HHS Secretary available at
http://cciio.cms.gov/programs/marketreforms/mlr/states/Wisconsin/wi_public_comment_consumers_unio
n.pdf.pdf
69
Id. If some issuers exit the individual market, and thus effectively reduce consumer choice, it
does not necessarily prove that consumers will be worse off. Especially, as many carriers are able to meet
the new MLR standard while remain solvent and recognize profits, the HHS should allow the market to
operate freely and single out inferior issuers.
70
See, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub.L. 111-148, Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress, 42 USC 18001, Mar. 23, 1010,
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ148/pdf/PLAW-111publ148.pdf. The Act merely speaks
of market destabilization in the individual market, however, it does not provide any guidance as to what
constitutes market destabilization. The PHSA only permits the Secretary to grant a waiver to the 80%
MLR if the Secretary finds a possibility of market destabilization due to the immediate application of the
80%. However, the PHSA is silent as to any specific definition for market destabilization. It also does not
afford a process or criteria under which the Secretary may make a determination regarding potential
destabilization of that market. Moreover, the PHSA does not specify “the kind or amount of adjustment
the Secretary may market.”
See also, HHS, 45 CFR Part 158, “Health Insurance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss Ratio
(MLR) Requirements Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Interim Final Rule,” Federal
Register, December 1, 2010, p. 74886. The HHS could have provided a standard definition of market
destabilization and give more guidance as to the criteria for determining destabilization. However, the
HHS chose to remain relatively vague and ambiguous.
66

16

timely public disclosures of adjustment requests71 with an extended public hearing period72
requiring insurers to present hard data73 while affording the consumers an opportunity for active
participation in the process.74 On the opposite side of the spectrum, the issuers are criticizing the
HHS for imposing a crippling 80 percent MLR standard on issuers in the individual market and
for computing the agents’ and brokers’ commission as an administrative cost in the MLR
formula.75
Given the two extreme positions, the HHS has a difficult job trying to balance the
different interests. First, to ensure that consumers receive value for their premiums and that
issuers have clear guidance when they can apply for a waiver, the HHS should provide a clear,
workable definition and uniform principles for how to measure destabilization in the individual
market.76 The ambiguity of the five criteria under section 158.33077 creates a potentially

HHS, 45 CFR Part 158, “Health Insurance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss Ratio (MLR)
Requirements Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Interim Final Rule,” Federal
Register, Dec. 1, 2010, p. 74886 -74888. Section 158.340 through 158.345: To insure efficiency, the
State’s request for adjustment must be submitted in electronic format and will be promptly posted on the
Secretary’s healthcare.gov website, at which point in time the Secretary will then invite public comment
and consider any comments filed by the public within 10 days of the posting. The final rule states that the
State will also have an opportunity to hold a public hearing and create an evidentiary record. However,
the only HHS encourages, but does not require states to hold public hearings for adjustment requests
72
Id.
73
See, Letter from HCAN to Kathleen Sebelius, HHS Secretary, “OCIIO-9998-IFC” (Jan. 31,
2011), available at http://healthcareforamericanow.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/HCAN-Commentson-MLR-Rule-FINAL-31Jan11.pdf. Like the Florida example demonstrates, the request for adjustment is
often missing supporting data. This is also evident from the fact that 10 out of 17 requests were in fact
rejected by the HHS Secretary.
74
Letter from HCAN to Kathleen Sebelius, HHS Secretary, “OCIIO-9998-IFC” (Jan. 31, 2011),
supra. The Office of Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight urges the HHS in the final rule to
strengthen the process as outlined in the final rule to require a public hearing for each adjustment request.
“While states also are encouraged (but not required) to hold hearings regarding the such requests,
experience with state-level hearings so far indicates that insurers often do not present hard data or face
tough questions (Missouri) and that consumers are not invited to be full participants (Florida), depriving
them of the opportunity to ask critical questions of state officials, insurance executives and producers.”
71

75

See fn 59 and 60.

76

See fn 33.
See fn 36.

77
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dangerous result78 by effectively having different standards in determining market destabilization
in different states.79 Second, as suggested by consumer advocates, the HHS should require public
disclosures of adjustment requests80 with an extended public hearing period.81 The extension will
ensure that insurers present hard data82 and that all interested parties, including issuers, agents
and brokers, healthcare providers and consumers have an opportunity to voice their concerns
regarding the MLR waiver application.83 Third, the HHS should maintain a MLR policy of
requiring agents’ and brokers’ fees to be calculated as an administrative cost since the impact on
agents and brokers is already part of Secretary’s determination within the realm of waiver

78

See, fn 32, 33.
See also, Letter from Ethan Rome, HCAN executive director, to Kathleen Sebelius, HHS
Secretary, (Oct 26, 2011), “Re: Florida MLR Adjustment Application and HCAN Request for Public
Hearing” available at http://healthcareforamericanow.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/HCAN-publiccomment-Florida.pdf. As the Florida example demonstrates, waiver grant can deprive consumers of $140
million. This example demonstrates, how important it is to be able to anticipate when a State can receive a
waiver so that the consumers can expect to get rebates.
79
See fn 37. The clear criteria will create more certainty forcing insurers to submit hard data.
80
HHS, 45 CFR Part 158, “Health Insurance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss Ratio (MLR)
Requirements Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Interim Final Rule,” Federal
Register, Dec. 1, 2010, p. 74886 -74888. Section 158.340 through 158.345: To insure efficiency, the
State’s request for adjustment must be submitted in electronic format and will be promptly posted on the
Secretary’s healthcare.gov website, at which point in time the Secretary will then invite public comment
and consider any comments filed by the public within 10 days of the posting. Once the Secretary
concludes that the State’s request for an adjustment to the MLR standard is sufficient under section
158.330 and the public comment period has expired, the Secretary will make a resolution generally within
30 days, but not more than 60 days, to either grant or deny the State’s request. The final rule states that
the State will also have an opportunity to hold a public hearing and create an evidentiary record.
However, the only HHS encourages, but does not require states to hold public hearings for adjustment
requests
81
Id.
82
See, Letter from HCAN to Kathleen Sebelius, HHS Secretary, “OCIIO-9998-IFC” (Jan. 31,
2011), available at http://healthcareforamericanow.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/HCAN-Commentson-MLR-Rule-FINAL-31Jan11.pdf. Like the Florida example demonstrates, the request for adjustment is
often missing supporting data. This is also evident from the fact that 10 out of 17 requests were in fact
rejected by the HHS Secretary.
83
Id. The Office of Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight urges the HHS in the final rule
to strengthen the process as outlined in the final rule to require a public hearing for each adjustment
request. “While states also are encouraged (but not required) to hold hearings regarding the such requests,
experience with state-level hearings so far indicates that insurers often do not present hard data or face
tough questions (Missouri) and that consumers are not invited to be full participants (Florida), depriving
them of the opportunity to ask critical questions of state officials, insurance executives and producers.”
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applications.84 Moreover, as the Director of Health Reform for Consumers Union, DeAnn
Friedholm, pointed out that there is overwhelming evidence showing that the MLR is working
for consumers and therefore should not be weakened by this regulation.85 In the end, consumers
do not benefit from infinite health insurance choices if they provide inferior services.86
III.

Notice Requirements
A. HHS’ Interpretation of Notice Requirement
In response to public comments, the HHS issued an amendment to the final regulation on

May 16, 2012, effective on June 15, 2012, establishing a onetime simple notice requirement for
all issuers in the group and individual markets that meet or exceed the applicable MLR standard
in the 2011 MLR reporting year.87
The amendment introduced new notice requirements to ensure that all consumers,
regardless of whether they are owed a rebate, receive an informational notice informing them

84

See fn. 64.
Id.
86
Email from Consumers Union to Kathleen Sebelius, HHS Secretary available at
http://cciio.cms.gov/programs/marketreforms/mlr/states/Wisconsin/wi_public_comment_consumers_unio
n.pdf.pdf Consumers undeniably need strong market competition to keep health insurance costs down
and service up. However, if some issuers exit the individual market, and thus effectively reduce consumer
choice, it does not necessarily prove that consumers will be worse off. Especially, as many carriers are
able to meet the new MLR standard while remain solvent and recognize profits, the HHS should allow the
market to operate freely and single out inferior issuers.
See also, Peter Harbage, “The Inefficient Individual Health Insurance Market,” Center for
American Progress Action Fund (March 23, 2009), available at
http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/healthcare/report/2009/03/23/5802/the-inefficientindividual-health-insurance-market/ “The Congressional Budget Office estimates that 29 percent of
premium dollars in the individual insurance market go toward administrative costs on average. This is
more than double the average rate in the group market, where roughly 12 percent of employer-sponsored
insurance premium dollars are spent on administrative costs.”
87
HHS, 45 CFR Part 158, “Medical Loss Ratio Rebate Requirements Under the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act; Final Rule,” Federal Register, May 16, 2012, §158.251(a)(1), p. 28797. Thus,
even for issuers that meet or exceed the MLR target, the HHS requires to provide a simple notice of the
MLR information to policyholders on or after July 1, 2012 with the first plan document. Accordingly, this
notice requirement applies only for the 2011 reporting year.
85
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whether the issuer has met or exceeded the minimum MLR requirement for current year.88 The
notice must also provide consumers with educational information regarding the MLR rule,89 but
only in the first year when MLR is applied to increase consumers’ understanding of the
significance and implications of the MLR.90 The amendment does not require issuers to include
the issuer’s current or previous year’s MLR if the issuer has met or exceeded the standard, rather
the notice must merely direct the subscribers to the HHS website, HealthCare.gov., where they
can find issuers’ actual MLRs and compare MLR information across issuers and years.91
In addition to the standard language requirements, the HHS prescribes that the notice be
prominently and clearly displayed on the front of the plan document, insurance policy or
certificate.92 Alternatively, it can also be written separately and may be included in the same
mailing as other mailed notices93 or it can be send electronically consistent with the

88

Id. See, §158.251(a)(2) for issuers that meet or exceed the MLR target.
See also, HHS, 45 CFR Part 158, “Health Insurance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss Ratio
(MLR) Requirements Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Interim Final Rule,” Federal
Register, Dec. 1, 2010, §158.250, p. 74885. Section 158.250 requires issuers that did not meet the MLR
target to provide enrollees with a rebate notification along with any rebate check or premium credit. “The
rebate notification must include a brief explanation of what an MLR is, why the ACA created the policy
(for example, increased transparency, incentive to lower premiums), and why the enrollee is receiving a
rebate. It must also include the aggregate amount of premium revenue reported by the issuer during the
MLR reporting year, the issuer MLR [], the required MLR threshold, [etc.]” HHS includes three reasons
for this requirement. First, “[e]nrollees may not understand why they are receiving a rebate and may not
be familiar with the significance of the MLR and the rebate requirement in the Affordable Care Act.”
Second, “enrollees have no explanation as to how rebates are calculated.” Third, MLR transparency is a
way to educate consumers and promote informed decision-making in the purchasing of health insurance.”
89
See, example of MLR notice with rebate from Florida UnitedHealthcare, available at
http://broker.uhc.com/assets/reform-MLR-external-letter-explanation-of-payment-sample.pdf
See also, example of MLR notice from Horizon BCBS of NJ that met or exceeded the MLR,
available at http://www.horizonblue.com/sites/default/files/pdf/871%20%20BB%202012%20MLR%20Notice%204%20FINAL.pdf
90
See fn 86.
91
Id, see also fn 87.
92
HHS, 45 CFR Part 158, “Medical Loss Ratio Rebate Requirements Under the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act; Final Rule,” Federal Register, May 16, 2012. §158.251(a)(3).
93
Id.
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requirements for electronic disclosure under section 2715 of the PHSA.94 With the standard
language requirements and expansive mailing options, the HHS attempted to minimize the
burden on the issuers95 while attempting to educate consumers about the new law.96

B. Consumers Position on HHS’ Notice Requirement
Consumer advocates are generally satisfied with the amendments to the final rule.97
However, they recommend strengthening the rule98 and remove ambiguities in several areas,99 as
well as, to require issuers to disclose their current and previous year’s MLRs.100 These measures
will increase health plan transparency,101 reduce consumer confusion102 and insure that all

94

Id.
Id. According to the HHS estimates, approximately 278 to 337 issuers that provide services to
65.8 million to 72.2 million subscribers will meet or exceed the minimum MLR standard and hence be
subject to the new notice requirement. Thus, to minimize the burden on the issuers, the HHS requires
issuers to use standard language for notices and gives issuers’ an option of providing the notices with
other plan documents or submitting them electronically in compliance with section 2715 of the PHSA.
These cost saving measures would keep administrative cost of preparing and mailing the MLR notices
only at about 3 million in 2012 for the 2011 reporting year, which is about $0.16 per notice, including
labor and supply costs.
96
See, fn. 86.
97
HHS, 45 CFR Part 158, “Medical Loss Ratio Rebate Requirements Under the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act; Final Rule,” Federal Register, May 16, 2012, p. 28791.
See also, Letter from Consumer Groups to the HHS, “RE: File Code CMS-9998-FC (Medical
Loss Ratio Requirements)” (Jan. 6, 2012), available at http://healthcareforamericanow.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/01/mlr-final-rule-consumer-comments-Final.pdf.
98
Id . Consumer advocacy groups believe that every subscriber of a fully insured product, not just
the ones that are owed a rebate, should receive an annual, rather than a onetime notice. A onetime notice
is better than no notice, however, there is a danger that the subscriber either does not receive the notice or
simply does not pay attention to its significance. A yearly notice increases the chances that the subscribers
will read about the MLR rule and its implications.
99
Id. Currently, the HHS requires a general, standard language to inform consumers of MLR.
However, the final rule does not demand any detailed account of why the issuer did not meet the MLR
and how exactly MLR is calculated. By requiring issuers to describe in greater detail what MLR is, how it
is calculated and what it means for the consumers, consumers will be able to better informed about the
benefits of MLR, which would further the purpose of the ACA.
100
See, Letter from Consumer Groups to the HHS, “RE: File Code CMS-9998-FC (Medical Loss
Ratio Requirements)” (Jan. 6, 2012), available at http://healthcareforamericanow.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/01/mlr-final-rule-consumer-comments-Final.pdf
101
Id.
102
Id.
95
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subscribers, not just the ones that are owed a rebate, receive information about the nature and
purpose of the MLR, and are able to evaluate the existing issuer’s performance.103
First, the consumer advocacy groups believe that every subscriber of a fully insured
product, not just the ones that are owed a rebate, should receive a notice that is sent out annually
rather than once.104 The concern is that if the communications about the purpose of the MLR are
infrequent or made only to a selected group of enrollees, there is a risk that not all consumers
will in fact be educated about the new law and thus lose the benefits associated with MLR.105 In
addition, even assuming that every subscriber receives the notice and understands the
implications of the MLR regulation, future subscribers will not have the same opportunity.106
Second, due to the enormous intricacies of the healthcare reform,107 consumer advocacy
groups demand a higher level of detail from the issuers regarding the new MLR notice
requirements.108 The burden of providing detailed information about the MLR should rest with
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See, fn 97.
Id. Enrollees who are entitled to rebates would receive a more detailed notice explaining the

rebate.
Id. “A regular, annual communication would accomplish several things. (1) Consumers can begin
to learn about this dimension of their health plan via a well-crafted notice. If these communications are
made infrequently to only a handful of consumers, the goal of increased transparency will not be
accomplished. (2) If the goal of informed decision making is to be realized, consumers must be able to
connect strong MLRs with the correct health plans. Clear notices, in conjunction with the posting of plan
MLR data on the HHS website (as required by Section 2718(a) of the ACA), are essential to achieving
that end.”
106
Id. Because the HHS only requires a onetime notice, all future subscribers will not have the same
opportunity to learn about the MLR regulation.
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Mark Blumenthal, “Obamacare Ruling: Polls Point To Confusion, Unhappiness No Matter
What,” huffingtonpost.com (June, 26, 2012), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/26/polls-obamacare-supreme-court-ruling_n_1628561.html
“The Kaiser Family Foundation has found just less than half of Americans -- ranging between 42 and 55
percent, with no apparent trend -- say that the word "confused" describes their feelings about the health
care law.”
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See, Letter from Consumer Groups to the HHS, “RE: File Code CMS-9998-FC (Medical Loss
Ratio Requirements)” (Jan. 6, 2012), available at http://healthcareforamericanow.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/01/mlr-final-rule-consumer-comments-Final.pdf
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the issuers, who have more resources109 and greater expertise to sift through the complicated
language of the MLR regulation and thus are in a better position to educate consumers about the
new rule. 110 Consumer advocates are especially concerned about possibility of issuers taking
advantage of consumers’ lack of understanding of the MLR and its calculation in an attempt to
avoid spending the required 80 percent on healthcare or activities that improve its quality.111
Accordingly, the perception is that if consumers receive more information about the MLR, there
is a higher chance that they will know how much of their premium dollars their current issuer
spends on healthcare and QIAs.112
Third, consumer advocacy groups recommend that the frequent notices include in
conjunction with an MLR description, the subscribers plans’ current and previous year’s MLRs,
HHS, 45 CFR Part 158, “Medical Loss Ratio Rebate Requirements Under the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act; Final Rule,” Federal Register, May 16, 2012, p. 28795. Issuers are in a better
position than average subscribers to provide information about MLR at a minimal cost of $0.16 per
notice.
110
See, HHS, “CMS releases final rule on MLR requirements” (May 12, 2012) available at
http://www.healthreformgps.org/resources/cms-releases-final-rule-on-mlr-requirements/ “The goal of the
notice is to educate consumers regarding the MLR measures and to help consumers know that the
majority of premium payments go towards health care, as opposed to advertising, executive bonuses, or
administrative overhead costs.” Accordingly, it is only sensible that HHS would require issuers to alert
policyholders and subscribers about the MLR existence.
111
See fn 63.
See also, H.R. 1206: Access to Professional Health Insurance Advisors Act of 2011, available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr1206ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr1206ih.pdf. This new bill is the
most controversial example of a situation where issuers can take advantage of consumer’s ignorance
about the MLR formula. This new bill creates an exemption for agents and brokers by excluding their fees
from the MLR formula allowing issuers to move these expenses off the books. This exclusion would
result in lower actual MLRs allowing issuers to spend a lower portion of the premium dollars on health
care and quality improvement. Thus, the MLR will no longer be a useful indicator of how much issuers
actually spend on health care and overhead. This example perfectly illustrates the need for educating
consumers about the MLR rule and the need for more transparency.
112
HHS, 45 CFR Part 158, “Medical Loss Ratio Rebate Requirements Under the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act; Final Rule,” Federal Register, May 16, 2012, p. 28793.
See also, Peter Harbage, “The Inefficient Individual Health Insurance Market,” Center for
American Progress Action Fund (March 23, 2009), available at
http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/healthcare/report/2009/03/23/5802/the-inefficientindividual-health-insurance-market/ “The Congressional Budget Office estimates that 29 percent of
premium dollars in the individual insurance market go toward administrative costs on average. This is
more than double the average rate in the group market, where roughly 12 percent of employer-sponsored
insurance premium dollars are spent on administrative costs.”
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which will reduce confusion as to whether the policyholder is entitled to a rebate or not113 and
allow consumers to evaluate and compare the issuer’s two year performance with other
issuers.114 This ability would allow consumers not only to understand the issuers’ efficient use of
the premium revenue, but ultimately help consumers to better utilize the MLR information when
making plan choices.115 Currently, the final regulation relies on the issuers’ voluntariness in
providing a notification about the MLR and the fact that no rebate is owed.116 However,
consumer advocates argue that such reliance is impractical, rather unrealistic,117 and will result in
random notifications.118 This in fact can lead to counterproductive outcomes because random
notices will not only spread more confusion and irritation among the consumers, if the issuers
spontaneously decide to start sending out random notices, 119 but will also fail to establish a
ubiquitous presence vital in creation of new expectations among consumers.120
C. Insurers’ Position on HHS’ Notice Requirement
Health insurance issuers strongly oppose the updated notice requirement in the final
regulation,121 because it not only unnecessarily increases administrative costs for issuers that

HHS, 45 CFR Part 158, “Medical Loss Ratio Rebate Requirements Under the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act; Final Rule,” Federal Register, May 16, 2012, p. 28794.
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Requirements Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Interim Final Rule,” Federal
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meet or exceed the MLR target, but also confuses consumers and provides them with little
value.122
First, the issuers argue that the additional notification requirements would affect a large
number of issuers123 in the individual and group markets that meet or exceed the applicable MLR
requirement imposing an unnecessary burden on such issuers.124 However, according to the HHS
estimates, the total administrative cost for preparing and mailing notices to issuers that meet or
exceed the MLR target would amount to approximately three million dollars, an average cost of
merely $9,000 to 10,000 per issuer for the 2011 reporting year.125 This amount translates to an
average added cost of $0.16 per enrollee for preparing and sending a notice by mail, including
labor and supply costs.126 Thus, the issuers concerns seem unjustified since the incurred expenses
are rather minimal, and under the current regulation, are a one-time cost.127
Second, the issuers argue that the amended notice rule will spread confusion among
consumers and therefore provide very little value.128 Thus, consumers could either misinterpret
the MLR information provided in the notices, or may mistakenly believe that they are owed a
rebate.129 This concern appears reasonable; however, not because consumers will receive the
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HHS, 45 CFR Part 158, “Medical Loss Ratio Rebate Requirements Under the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act; Final Rule,” Federal Register, May 16, 2012, p. 28795. The HHS estimated
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MLR notice, but rather because consumers will receive this notice only once instead of annually,
creating more uncertainty and less transparency.130
Finally, the issuers fear that the updated mandatory notice requirement will not only
confuse, but likely mislead consumers leading to dangerously mistaken inferences regarding
issuers’ performance.131 Essentially, the issuers argue that an issuer’s MLR from the current and
prior reporting year is not necessarily a reliable indicator of health plan performance,132 because
it ignores the real catalyst of rising premiums133 and fails to take into consideration, value

Id. See also, Letter from Consumer Groups to the HHS, “RE: File Code CMS-9998-FC (Medical
Loss Ratio Requirements)” (Jan. 6, 2012), available at http://healthcareforamericanow.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/01/mlr-final-rule-consumer-comments-Final.pdf. The HHS Secretary Kathleen
Sebelius said in a blog to consumers that “If your insurance company is providing fair value for your
premium dollars, you should know that.”130 However, in order for the Secretary’s statement to have teeth,
the notice should be expanded as proposed by the consumer advocacy groups.
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J C Robinson, “Use and abuse of the medical loss ratio to measure health plan performance,”
Health Affairs, 16, no.4 (1997):176-187, http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/16/4/176.full.pdf.
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Id. “The medical loss ratio is a ratio of medical expenditures to insurance premiums. High ratios
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denominator (low insurance premiums). The medical loss ratio, as a ratio of the two, can be measuring the
impact of medical market competition on expenditures or of insurance market competition on premiums.
For example, a statistical analysis of medical loss ratios in three states found that administrative loss
ratios were higher (and medical loss ratios were lower) in plans that relied extensively on capitation rather
than on fee-for-service; this difference was attributable solely to the lower total premiums charged by the
capitation-oriented plans (the denominator of the medical loss ratio) rather than to differences in
administrative expenses per enrollee. Moreover, neither premiums nor expenditures by themselves
indicate quality of care. More direct measures of quality are available, including patient satisfaction
surveys, preventive services use, and severity-adjusted clinical outcomes. Although each of these is
limited in scope, they at least shed light on quality of care. The medical loss ratio does not.” In addition
the article emphasizes that “health insurers, interpret the variation in rates of medical and surgical
procedures across U.S. geographic areas as indicators of inefficiency within the medical care delivery
system.” In fact they “interpret high medical loss ratios as proof of medical waste.” Accordingly, “the
medical loss ratio sheds no clear light on medical or administrative expenditures and so cannot illuminate
the much murkier issue of medical or administrative waste.”
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See, AHIP Statement on the Medical Loss Ratio Requirement (April 26, 2012) available at
http://www.ahip.org/News/Press-Room/2012/AHIP-Statement-on-the-Medical-Loss-RatioRequirement.aspx.
See also, Annemarie Bridy, “Secret Prices & High-Tech Devices: How Medical Device
Manufacturers are Seeking to Sustain Profits by Propertizing Prices,” Texas Intellectual Property Law
Journal (Feb. 9, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1242462. “One study conducted in 2002
found drugs and medical devices together accounted for 22% of healthcare insurance premium increases
in the U.S. from 2001 to 2002.”
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depreciating,134 and what the issuers claim, value enhancing services,135 that are not captured in
the MLR formula, but that can either positively or negatively affect the issuers’ year-to-year
MLRs.136 Accordingly, issuers can enlarge their MLRs if they, for instance, reduce agents’ and
brokers’ commissions, reduce the number or in-network physicians or decrease other expenses
on services that do not constitute QIA under the current MLR regulation.137 On the other hand,
the new regulation reduces issuers MLRs because the HHS does not consider many of the
services provided by issuers to their subscribers as quality improvement activity.138 One such
example is the fraud prevention activity, which is considered an administrative expense.139

US Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters, “Private Health
Insurance: Early Experiences Implementing New Medical Loss Ratio Requirements,” GAO (July 2011),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11711.pdf.
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Met,” Bloomberg BNA (May 16, 2012), available at http://www.bna.com/hhs-finalizes-requirementn12884909399/.
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HHS, 45 CFR Part 158, “Health Insurance Issuers Implementing Medical Loss Ratio (MLR)
Requirements Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Interim Final Rule,” Federal
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However, issuers have argued that fraud prevention activities “improve patient safety and deter
the use of medically unnecessary services, thus providing a higher level of healthcare quality.”140
The HHS rejected issuers’ argument stating that it will continue to exclude fraud prevention
activities from QIA141 and allow inclusion only of payments recovered through fraud reduction
efforts as adjustments to incurred claims, which in turn has the potential of increasing issuers
MLRs.142 The debate over QIA exemplifies the complexity of what exactly is included in the
MLR and accordingly supports issuers’ argument that providing consumers with MLRs would
only create confusion and lead to mistaken inferences.143 For that reason, issuers believe that
comparing the year-to-year MLRs could mislead consumers.144
D. Criticism and Recommendations for HHS Notice Requirement Policy

HHS, 45 CFR Part 158, “Medical Loss Ratio Requirements Under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act; Final Rule,” Federal Register, December 7, 2011, p. 76577. However, some
provider associations expressed their concerns about characterizing fraud prevention activities as QIA
stating that the lack of clear definition for fraud detection and recovery may lead to improper
characterization of certain activities as fraud detection. In particular, failure to include all fraud reduction
efforts under QIA would cause issuers to reduce their fraud detection efforts, decrease patient safety and
quality of care and thus undercut the federal government’s efforts in preventing and prosecuting fraud.
141
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and Affordable Care Act; Final Rule,” Federal Register, May 16, 2012, p. 28791. HHS looks at these
concerns as unpersuasive since issuers will most likely continue to invest in fraud reduction and
prevention, regardless of MLR treatment in light of the enormous net savings from anti-fraud operations.
In 2008 the net savings from anti-fraud operations were more than $3 per enrollee among large issuers, $1
per enrollee among medium sized issuers and $2.7 per enrollee among small issuers.
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Id. This compromise, according to HHS, will give issuers an opportunity to recover monies
invested to deter fraud, and thus mitigate any disincentives issuers may have to invest in these
activities,142 while at the same time preserving the purpose of requiring issuers to comply with the
applicable MLR standard in the ACA.
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See also, US Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters, “Private
Health Insurance: Early Experiences Implementing New Medical Loss Ratio Requirements,” GAO (July
2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11711.pdf. Essentially, the issuers argue that by
reducing other services that they consider either health care or quality improving activity expenses, they
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Consumer advocates key demand is that the HHS should strengthen and remove
ambiguities from the mandatory MLR notice requirements and require the issuers to disclose
their current and previous year’s MLRs.145 On the other hand, issuers believe that the current
notice requirements already impose an unnecessary burden on the issuers that meet or exceed the
applicable standard and are likely to spread confusion and lead to misinterpretation of the
issuers’ MLRs.146
In an attempt to find the right course of action and meet the demands of the opposing
interest groups, the HHS adopted a balanced approach seeking to minimize the cost of additional
notice requirement to the issuers while protecting the interests of consumers.147 Essentially, the
HHS determined that on one hand, failing to require MLR information notices from issuers that
meet or exceed the applicable MLR standard would result in reduced transparency regarding
how the issuers spend their premium dollars,148 whereas on the other hand, any greater notice
requirements, like those demanded by the consumer advocates, would impose a greater burden
on the issuers than is necessary.149 However, the HHS misses the mark by requiring merely a
simple onetime notice, rather than an ongoing annual MLR notice that includes general
information as well as issuer’s current and previous year’s MLR since such additional
requirements create important benefits for both issuers and consumers.150
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Frist, random notices will only increase confusion and irritation among the consumers.151
The ongoing annual MLR notices, on the other hand, will establish a ubiquitous presence, which
is essential in creation of new expectations among consumers.152 Knowing where and how the
premiums are spend, will likely reduce consumers’ resentment and disappointment with the
relentless annual health insurance cost increases.153 Moreover, the HHS itself predicts that,
through the notice requirement, the insurers will have an incentive to “maximize the percentage
of premium dollars they spend on healthcare and activities that improve healthcare quality”
rather than spend the absolute minimum in order to avoid paying out rebates. 154 Thus, the HHS
should follow its own prediction and establish an annual MLR notice requirement, which is
essential in overcoming uncertainty and increasing consumer understanding of how their dollars
are spend.155
Second, the issuers unfortunately believe that providing consumers with more
information in the notice will be too burdensome and counterproductive.156 However, the general
information about the MLR and the actual MLR numbers will be available on the HHS website
anyway, which must be referenced in the notices.157 Thus, by requiring the issuers to provide
more information in the actual MLR notices, the HHS would only ease consumers’ access to
Letter from consumer, patients and employees to the HHS, “Re: File Code CMS-9998-FC
(Medical Loss Ratio Requirements,” (Jan. 6, 2012), available at http://healthcareforamericanow.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/01/mlr-final-rule-consumer-comments-Final.pdf
152
See, fn 112.
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available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/28/business/health-insurance-costs-rise-sharply-this-year-studyshows.html?pagewanted=all. “The steep increase in rates is particularly unwelcome at a time when the economy is
still sputtering and unemployment continues to hover at about 9 percent. Many businesses cite the high cost of
coverage as a factor in their decision not to hire, and health insurance has become increasingly unaffordable for
more Americans. Over all, the cost of family coverage has about doubled since 2001, when premiums averaged
$7,061, compared with a 34 percent gain in wages over the same period.”
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such information and enable consumers to evaluate their issuer’s performance on the spot, rather
than open entirely new doors to such data. Also, issuers argument that the consumers might
misinterpret the MLR information because the MLR formula is complex and contains disputed
activities,158 is unpersuasive. 159 The NAIC and the HHS have already determined that MLR is a
reliable measure of issuers’ performance in terms of their spending on healthcare and QIA versus
administrative costs.160 Accordingly, the HHS should require issuers to include more information
about the MLR in general, and demand that issuers’ provide their current and past year’s MLRs.
Third, issuers argue vehemently that the mandatory notice requirement is too costly.161
However, the HHS has already determined that the benefits to consumers will outweigh the
administrative costs incurred by insurers through the issuance of notices to the policyholders.162
In particular, according to the HHS estimates, the total administrative cost for preparing and
mailing notices to issuers that meet or exceed the MLR target would merely amount to
approximately three million dollars, an average cost of $9,000 to 10,000 per issuer for the 2011
reporting year,163 translating to an average added cost of $0.16 per enrollee for preparing and
sending a notice by mail, including labor and supply costs.164 Importantly, the estimates are for
the first time notices only.165 Thus, it is reasonable to assume that by requiring frequent annual
notices, the cost of such notices can be reduced even further over time as the notices become
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more automated.166 This only supports the recommendation that the HHS should require annual
notices.
Thus, with these important amendments to the final rule the HHS can expect to achieve
greater transparency and more accountability regarding how the issuers use their premium
revenue, which is the main purpose of the ACA.167
I.

Conclusion
The American healthcare system is in a desperate need for significant reforms since it is

riddled with inefficiencies and excessive administrative costs. With the passage of the new MLR
regulation, embedded in the ACA, the Obama administration attempts to restore confidence into
the healthcare system by holding health insurance issuers accountable for their expenses and
ensure that the American people receive value for their premium dollars.
The new rule requires issuers in small group and individual health insurance markets to
spend at least 80 percent and issuers in large group market to spend at least 85 percent of the
premiums on healthcare and quality improvement activities. However, as this paper argues, the
HHS’s interpretation of the MLR requirement has failed to adequately address many consumer
concerns as they relate to the MLR waiver policy in the individual market and the MLR notice
requirements for issuers in group and individual markets that meet or exceed the applicable MLR
requirement.
This paper has examined two competing positions on waivers and the notice requirements
proposed by the consumer advocates and the issuers, and investigated the HHS’ success in
attempting to balance these different interests. Having identified several troubling parts, the
paper offers important recommendations for the HHS to provide more guidance and improve the
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current regulation. Several important recommendations advise the HHS to provide a clear
workable definition for market destabilization, and to demand timely public disclosure of the
MLR waiver request in conjunction with hard data and extension of the public hearing period to
permit all interested parties to participate in the waiver process. In addition, the HHS is advised
to require an annual mandatory MLR notice from all issuers that describes in greater detail what
the MLR is and discloses the issuers current and previous year’s MLRs.
In summary, the HHS has promulgated an important consumer empowering regulation,
but there is still a lot of work to be done. After many years of being held in the dark about
healthcare spending, consumers deserve to know how their premium dollars are spend and
demand that the bulk of their premium dollars is primarily spend on healthcare and QIA, instead
of overhead, marketing, advertising and extravagant CEO bonuses.
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